

both meanings at the same time, as is the case in this epigram. Here its sense is initially descriptive of the *bon vivant* epicure, until the final question which all but confirms an unsavoury undertone.<sup>35</sup>

Some final observations: four of these six examples occur in distichs, the remaining two being found in somewhat longer pieces. But note the part played by *lingua* in all cases but one (2.82.1): it is a word of closure, crucial to the “point,” and located in the last verse. In contrast, the seven sexually *explicit* examples from the same poet make use of *lingua* only once as *fulmen in clausula* (11.25.2), the other instances appearing elsewhere in an epigram in the company of a verb describing oral activity (*lambebat . . . fellaret* 2.61.2, 7; *lambere* 3.81.2; *linguam . . . fututricem* 11.61.10; *lingis* 11.85.1). Five of the six epigrams from the “ambiguous” category are addressed directly to named men in the vocative, and could refer either to *cunnilinctio* or *fellatio*, or both (with the exception of 3.84.2 where *cunnilinctio* alone is specified, and 9.27.14 where the reference to *draucus* confirms male-to-male *fellatio*). 13.71.2 is addressed generally to the reader, but the oral practices possibly implied by *gulosus* could again involve congress with either or both sexes. As a further variation on the narrative approach employed in the “ambiguous” pieces, we notice that in the “explicit” poems the male perpetrators of oral sex are twice addressed directly (*Baetice* 3.81.2; *Zoile* 11.85.1), twice described by name in the third person (*Linus* 11.25.2; *Nanneius* 11.61), and once anonymously in the second person, but with a clear indication of a male identity (*cum tibi vernarent dubia lanugine malae* 2.61.1). If the “ambiguous” epigrams are, on the one hand, all but one addressed to males who indulge in generally *unspecified* oral activity, on the other hand, by way of contrast, the “explicit” epigrams depict males who engage in quite *specific cunnilinctio* (2.61.2, 7 being the exception where male-to-male *fellatio* is described).

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two senses at 12.41.1: *Non est, Tucca, satis quod es gulosus: / et dici cupis et cupis videri* and at 12.64.2 with, I would suggest, a sexual connotation: *Vincentem roseos facieque comaque ministros / Cinna cocum fecit. Cinna gulosus homo est*. Moreover in 11.61, the *linguam . . . fututricem* of v. 10 is described as *partem gulosam* in v. 13. Indeed, the metaphorical use of the vocabulary of “eating” applied to the sexual sphere is well attested in Latin; see Adams, *Sexual Vocabulary*, 138–41.

35. Might I also here record the suggestion of a possible play on *Phoenicopteri* in the *titulus* and the Greek φοινικίσειν (perform *cunnilinctio/fellatio/irrumatio*)? Whether the *titulus* be authentic or not, there is enough in the distich alone to identify the bird physically (*pinna rubens*), and by reference to its culinary exclusivity (*lingua gulosus/nostra sapit*).

#### MAKING LUCIAN LOGICAL: AN UNNECESSARY EMENDATION IN THE OXFORD TEXT OF THE *VITARUM AUCTIO* (23)

The Oxford text<sup>1</sup> of Lucian's *Vitarum Auctio* (23) reads (Chrysippus is the speaker):

1. MacLeod 1974.

- 1 ὁρᾷς δὲ δὴ καὶ τὸν συλλογισμόν οἷά φησιν· εἰ τὸν πρῶτον τοκὸν
- 2 λήψεται, (λήψεται) καὶ τὸν δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν πρῶτον
- 3 λήψεται, (λήψεται) ἄρα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον.

2 λήψεται semel codd.: bis Jacobitz || 2–3 ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . δεύτερον om. U (Vat. 1324) ||  
 3 λήψεται semel γ, recc.: bis Jacobitz (γ is the ancestor of a family of mss.)

The emendation of the manuscripts attributed to Jacobitz<sup>2</sup> (Teubner 1873, 1896) and accepted by MacLeod is unnecessary. Lucian is making a play on the wording of a Chrysippean law of logic, the force of which is weakened—if not destroyed—by this emendation.

Chrysippus' first law of logic reads as follows:<sup>3</sup>

εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον.

Chrysippus' system of deduction did not involve the Aristotelian logic of classes, but the logic of conditions.<sup>4</sup> It consisted of five so-called indemonstrable propositions, the first of which is quoted above.<sup>5</sup> The ancients noted its differences with Aristotelian logic, in particular its use of numbers as variables not letters of the alphabet, as is the case in the Aristotelian syllogism. Apuleius wrote that "Stoici porro pro litteris numeros usurpant, ut 'Si primum, secundum; atqui primum, secundum'"<sup>6</sup>—another instance of Chrysippus' first law.

Lucian is clearly aware of these Chrysippean laws and parodies them on several occasions. In the *Icaromenippus* (24), οἱ Χρυσίπποι συλλογισμοί are mentioned; while in the *Piscator* (41), the companion piece to the *Auctio*, Lucian has Parrhesiades require of all "false philosophers" πέντε δὲ συλλογισμούς ἐξ ἅπαντος· οὐ γὰρ θέμις ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι σοφόν.

Lucian uses the "first law" in another context, where the purpose is not to make fun of its precise wording—hence the verbal correspondence with the original law is less precise than in the *Auctio*. In the *Iuppiter Tragoedus* (51), Lucian has the Stoic Timocles state, Ἴδοις γὰρ εἰ ἀκόλουθα ταῦτα συλλογίζομαι, καὶ εἴ πῃ αὐτὰ δυνατόν σοι περιτρέψαι. εἰ γὰρ εἰσὶ βωμοί, εἰσὶ θεοί. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσὶ βωμοί· εἰσὶν ἄρα καὶ θεοί.<sup>7</sup>

Others have noted the humorous intent of this passage in the *Auctio*. Tackaberry states, "the effect is very humorous when he [Lucian] turns the syllogism on the

2. This was actually first proposed by Dindorf (1858) and followed by Jacobitz. This passage has had an interesting history over the centuries.

The Aldine Edition (1503) reads: εἰ τὸν πρῶτον τοκὸν λήψεται, καὶ τὸν δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν πρῶτον λήψεται, ἄρα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον. This same Greek appears in editions of 1519, 1545, 1555, 1563, 1615, 1619, 1687, and 1789. (An edition of 1743 reads εἴ τε instead of εἰ τὸν.)

Dindorf (1858) emended to εἰ τὸν πρῶτον τοκὸν λήψεται, λήψεται καὶ τὸν δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν πρῶτον λήψεται, λήψεται ἄρα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον. Fritzschius (1860) emended to εἰ τὸν πρῶτον τοκὸν [ὁ σπουδαῖος λαμβάνει], λήψεται καὶ τὸν δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν [λαμβάνει] τὸν πρῶτον, λήψεται ἄρα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον. Jacobitz (1873, 1896) accepted the reading of Dindorf, as did Haemon (1915) in the Loeb.

3. SVF vol. 2, p. 80 sec. 241 ap. Diog. Laert. VII 79.

4. J. B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (Leiden, 1970).

5. In more modern parlance, this is the law of affirming the antecedent, otherwise known as the *modus ponens*.

6. SVF vol. 2, p. 81 ap. Περὶ ἑρμηνείας 279.

7. J. Coenen, "Lukian Tragoedos," *Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie* 88 (1978) notes that Timocles' statement "in die Form eines regelrechten Syllogismus gekleidet est . . . der Schluss war stoisch."

question of usury.”<sup>8</sup> This emendation destroys this humorous effect, since Lucian is seeking to parody the crisp formulaic and mathematical quality of the Chrysippean original. Thus the text should follow the manuscripts and read:<sup>9</sup>

ὁρᾷς δὲ δὴ καὶ τὸν συλλογισμὸν οἷά φησιν· εἰ τὸν πρῶτον τοκὸν λήψεται, καὶ τὸν δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν πρῶτον· λήψεται ἄρα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον.

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8. W. H. Tackaberry, *Lucian's Relation to Plato and the Post-Aristotelian Philosophers*, University of Toronto Studies. Philological Series (Toronto, 1930), 16.

9. I wish to thank the anonymous referee who noted in support of my argument that “the use of λήψεται here may be part of Lucian's parody, as λαμβάνω = ‘posit’ vel sim. is a *vox technica* of the logical vocabulary (LSJ s.v. λαμβάνω A. I. 9. d) and there could be a deliberate double-entendre in its choice.” I also wish to thank Joseph T. and Doris A. Leichter, Joel Relihan, and David Konstan for their help with this project.